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CHANGE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES IN AN ERP 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Kemppainen, Ilkka, Turku Centre for Computer Sciences (TUCS) / University of Turku, 
Lemminkäisenkatu 14 A, FIN-20520 Turku, Finland, ilkka.kemppainen@utu.fi 
Abstract 
This case study analyses a multiyear ERP (SAP R/3) implementation project in a global company from 
perspectives of conflicts and problems the project faced. The paper reports on the core of the 
implementation activities from the start of the project in late 1995 until mid 2000, when most of the 
originally estimated implementation efforts were finished. The study reveals what pitfalls an 
inappropriate understanding of the magnitude of changes required for implementation involves and 
what unidentified consequences can result from this. The main reasons for problems encountered are 
discussed and analysed. The main lesson of the study is that the fundamental challenge of ERP 
implementations is not technology but organisational and human changes, which, if not properly 
understood and addressed, can lead to unidentified consequences causing implementation failures. 
Keywords: ERP implementation, change management, SAP R3, project management. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This report focuses on change management perspectives and challenges in a multiyear ERP 
implementation program in a global company with maritime business activities. The emphasis is on 
analysing and interpreting reasons for conflicts and problems the organisation faced when 
implementing a global ERP system. The report covers the period of late 1995-early 2000 during which 
time the system was implemented in the core businesses of the company on a global basis. After five 
and half years of implementation efforts, the implementation was not yet completely over: there were 
still few business units using their old systems not integrated with the ERP system intended as global. 
Reasons for implementing ERP systems, implementation management approaches and factors critical 
to successful implementations have been presented and discussed in the literature (e.g. Davenport 
1998, Bancroft et al. 1998, Somers and Nelson 2001, Brown and Vessey 2003, Mabert et al. 2003). 
Bancroft et al. (1998) was among the first who stressed that ERP implementation is a change 
management process. There are examples of failures to see this: one of them is the notorious case of 
FoxMeyer Drugs’ bankruptcy in 1996, a major cause of which has been proposed to have been its 
failed ERP implementation (Scott 1999). Companies have not always assessed carefully at all possible 
implications of their decisions to implement ERP systems (Bernroider and Koch 1999). Technical, 
managerial and economical reasons have often been offered as major reasons for implementation 
problems whereas the importance of the human side has not been much addressed in the context of 
ERP implementation studies. The report aims at shedding light on origins and reasons of ERP 
implementation problems rooted in the human side. 
2 RESEARCH METHODS 
I was employed by the case organisation for five and half years from late 1995 until spring 2000; i.e. 
from the very beginning of the implementation efforts reported here. In charge of the IT infrastructure 
of the company and as a member of the core project team, my main duty was to facilitate successful 
technological implementation of the global ERP system. The role gave me a chance to experience the 
implementation from a wide perspective over the years. Besides pure interaction, I directly influenced, 
even decided, on certain directions taken. This is why my level of involvement could be best 
characterised as that of an insider or a complete member. The report is based on data gathered from 
project documentation (i.e. project plans, minutes of meetings, memos, email correspondence, etc.), 
interviews, discussions and field notes I took. As a participant-observer, it is obvious that my 
interpretations have been influenced by my personal, subjective experiences (i.e. experiential data) in 
accordance with the generally accepted interpretive, ethnographic research methods used in IS 
research today (cf. Myers 1999). 
3 CASE BACKGROUND 
The case organisation, hereafter referred as MarineCargoSpecialist, is a global but relatively small 
company, which provides certain products and solutions for marine cargo flow handling. Its main 
customer base consists of shipyards providing newbuilding, modernisation and conversation services 
for shipowners and shipoperators. The solution base it offers include steel hatch covers, ship onboard 
cranes, Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) equipment, elevators, escalators, refrigeration and cargo securing 
products. The company is organised into divisions in accordance with the key product types. The after 
sales business is organised into a service division, which operates globally and is present in key ports 
around the world. In 1995, MarineCargoSpecialist employed roughly 900 people; today, it employs 
some 1100 people. Though the scope of its business activities has increased, this has not resulted in 
considerable increase of personnel. 
A specialty in its business model is lack of own manufacturing: everything, except for cargo cranes, is 
manufactured by third-party subcontractors on an order basis. Its main activities are in design, 
engineering and project management, including supervision of the subcontractors providing the 
components and associated services. MarineCargoSpecialist acts as a turnkey supplier for its 
customers, having the full responsibility of the scope of the supply. One of its greatest concerns is the 
efficiency of its operations. Margins in this business are not high due to fierce competition why even 
slight mistakes in the sales phase or during the delivery phase can erode them. The activities are 
usually organised into projects, which can last from few months to several years. Therefore project 
management combined with business control is of particular importance. 
Traditionally, each of the product divisions had a lot of autonomy. Their own organisations were built 
upon the need to manage their own activities more or less by themselves. The board of management 
consisted of CEO, CFO, head of legal and business administration services and the divisional general 
managers. The group provided a few shared, common services for the divisions; most importantly 
communication, legal and IT services. However, the global email system was the only common 
system for the whole group delivered, maintained and supported by the group personnel. All 
operational IT systems were based on local solutions delivered, maintained and supported by local IT 
responsibles and local suppliers. Also no common standards for such systems had been established. 
The decentralised information systems architecture and the high number of regional and local systems 
made it difficult to share information on a global basis. This often caused severe delays in the conduct 
of global business activities due to unavailability of timely information in operations and low quality 
and inaccuracy of information available. Usually such information was delivered in forms of 
documents only. Accurate and timely financial controlling of the business operations was also 
perceived problematic. To overcome these problems, a decision to invest in a global ERP system was 
made by the board. Several ERP system candidates were evaluated. There were no clear criteria 
defined for comparing and evaluating them. Rather, the final selection was based on “gut feelings” 
gained from demonstrations of important functionalities by vendors and feedback received from 
reference visits to and interviews held in end user organisations chosen for benchmarking. Finally 
SAP R/3 was chosen, mainly because of its perceived comprehensiveness, scalability and suitability 
for the global operations of the company. Especially the PS (Project System) module of SAP R/3 was 
seen critical. The targets for implementing the global system can be summarised as follows: 
• To harmonise existing, different business processes by implementing a common process 
framework through the introduction of the ERP system, 
• To establish a common, global information system for project management activities, along with 
integrated business control and financial reporting, 
• To establish a common core information system platform for the group, to be used as a means of 
generating further efficiency and effectiveness of the global operations. 
These targets were to be met by running a “Big Bang” ERP system implementation in two years. The 
target of the implementation was to cover over 80 % of the total business transactions (from new sales 
to after sales) of the whole group. The project activities were to be divided into four main phases: 
selection (as described above), analysis and configuration, implementation and rollout. 
4 IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS 
The selection of SAP R/3 was followed by a contract made with a consulting company, which was to 
deliver the majority of the necessary configuration and implementation services for the 
implementation of the new system. Few experienced key resources were recruited from outside of the 
company to cater for the internal preparation and project management activities due to the lack of such 
expertise in-house, especially within IT. The core project team was established, consisting of the 
project manager and teams for IT, finance and control, project management and after sales specific 
analysis and configuration activities. The teams were each to set up corresponding reference teams, 
which were to be used as the source of information in their corresponding fields and the validators of 
the solutions offered. No other particular implementation methodology besides the SAP’s proprietary, 
SAP R/3 Procedure Model, was followed. An analysis of the existing processes was commenced with 
the goal of redefining and establishing the new ideal processes for the basis of the system 
configuration and implementation. The focus of efforts was very much on the technical aspects of the 
conceived implementation efforts. The major challenges were identified as follows: 
• Establishment of and support for the required IT infrastructure, 
• Securing access to the required business knowledge and resources for establishing and validating 
requirements and the proper scope, 
• Appropriate configuration of the system, 
• Appropriate and adequate training of the key and end users. 
At first, there was a lot of enthusiasm about the capabilities of the system especially within the project 
team. Many of the project team members felt excited about the perceived capabilities and potential of 
the system: from the functional point of view, the new system seemed to be able to cater for almost 
anything. This was reflected in a comment given by the person in charge of configuring the SD (Sales 
& Distribution) module: “This system can do much more than we will ever need”. It was felt that 
setting up and configuring the system appropriately was a challenge but nobody seemed to doubt the 
success once all the technical pieces of that puzzle would have been covered, analysed and put in 
place. 
4.1 Problems surface 
Problems started surfacing soon when the overwhelming complexity of the system was gradually 
discovered. This quickly resulted in slippages from the challenging schedules as those in charge of 
configuring the system for demonstration and validation purposes were struggling with configuration 
options, data and resulting integration issues. Once schedules started shifting, it was painful to get the 
necessary business resources for repetitive validation and approval tasks. Certain business 
representatives were confused by the process-centric approach as they were used to work in very 
functional organisations. They discovered that the actual implementation of the system and especially 
its use would require a lot of inter-organisational communication and collaboration over the well-
established departmental and divisional borders. This was a surprise although they had been aware that 
one of the reasons for implementing the ERP system was to eliminate double or redundant work in the 
operations of the whole group. Fundamental issues were discovered in the area of master data 
management: As the chosen architecture was based on implementing one global system only, it was 
logically impossible to let different divisions to decide upon creation, maintenance and deletion of 
master data – such as customers, vendors and materials – in isolation from the others. Due to the 
shared nature of such data, it was necessary to figure out how to perform these activities in ways that 
would neither result in creation of double data nor in deletion of data critical to others. Such issues had 
neither been specifically identified nor addressed by the project in the beginning. At first, the project 
team did not put much attention to them as these problems were considered secondary and therefore 
not critical – to have the proper configuration in place was the most important issue. But for 
businesses questions of ownership and coordination like these were fundamental because they needed 
to understand how they could maintain control of data critical to their operations without causing 
unwanted delays resulting from coordination. After some time, the enthusiasm shared by the project 
team and the reference teams started gradually turning into frustration. 
Gradually the number of unaddressed and unsolved issues like these was increasing, which created 
mistrust and frustration among those trying to raise them. This in turn had an impact on the work to be 
carried out by the project team and the reference teams: it got actually harder to get approvals for 
crucial design decisions because reference teams were hesitant to make such decisions due to unsolved 
issues. This resulted in further delays, which in turn caused more loss of commitment among the 
business representatives due to continuously changing timetables. When business managers gradually 
started to understand that they were also about to lose some of their independency, autonomy and 
control of data and processes they once had had, they started showing sings of reluctance to get 
involved. Instead, they were sometimes merely holding back or trying to play time. When the budgets 
were overrun and it became evident that realising the expected benefits would take much longer than 
planned, bitter comments were often made about the actual need to have a global ERP system at all. 
4.2 Crisis stage 
By late 1996, the project was in crisis. The system configuration was not completed due to the lack of 
quality data, missing decisions and inadequate resources for configuration and validation of the 
system. It had also become evident that a true understanding and knowledge of the system, especially 
from the integration point of view, were missing among the consultants used. This resulted in change 
of the implementation approach: the majority of external consultants were decided to be kicked out 
after handing over their tasks to the core team members. The first rollout was finally performed almost 
a year behind the planned schedule. The rollout entity was a relatively small after sales business unit 
with two offices; one in Rotterdam, the Netherlands and another in Antwerp, Belgium. The rollout 
could not be considered successful due to low readiness of the organisation and the implemented 
solutions. According to the user feedback, the system was “too rigid and too difficult to learn and use”, 
the screen contents were “poorly organised” and there were far “too many screens and fields”. Further, 
the users could not understand why they needed to input data they could not see relevant for them or 
their business at all. Almost the whole project team ended up spending its time on these two sites for 
two months after the go-live date, fully tied up in end user support. 
Because of such difficulties, it was difficult to negotiate with businesses for further rollouts and gain 
commitment to them. In spring 1997, the second rollout was decided to take place in the cargo 
securing unit in Germany. The business had already been suffering a lot from heavy competition from 
suppliers of substitutes in China. The business was not profitable and a restructuring and cost savings 
program had been launched and was undergoing when the decision about the rollout was made. 
Consequently, people were laid off, and the resulting circumstances and atmosphere in the unit were 
both somewhat chaotic and tensed in general. Whilst most of the employees and managers in the 
business unit were literally struggling for keeping their jobs and were busy with managing day-to-day 
activities, the project team members were flying every week forth and back, stayed in hotels and were 
consuming resources (e.g. meeting rooms and beverages etc.) of the business unit. The employees 
were often seeking for intensive support from the project team, which they felt they did not receive 
due to “other, more important activities and commitments” some project team members claimed they 
had. This caused a lot of tension and mistrust between certain business representatives and project 
team members. As a result, the employees did not always bother to attend to scheduled project 
activities, which generated further delays. Some saw the members of the project team having too many 
liberties and privileges, and in their view the project was only losing money at the expense of the true 
business. For example, due to the lack of in-depth SAP R/3 knowledge and the decision to transfer 
knowledge from the consultants to the project team members, certain project team members received a 
lot of SAP R/3 training. In the circumstances, this was disliked by the genuine, hard-working business 
managers and employees: “We are working hard only to see you to spend the money we need to make. 
This is not fair”. 
When the key users and end users realised how much their existing tasks and roles would differ from 
the ones imposed by new the system, they often felt first confused and then stunned. They often 
discovered that the new system required a lot more than their quite simple legacy systems in terms of 
data input and reporting, because the new system was much more explicit, structured and richer in 
functionality. 
4.3 Recovery 
As the project had run into troubles, the level of commitment and support for it had been degrading on 
higher levels, too. For example, the CFO, who had been the true sponsor of the ERP implementation 
project, was seemingly trying to move away from the project. By the time of the ownership change in 
1997, there was nobody among the top management actively supporting and sponsoring the project. 
As a result of the ownership change, a new board of directors, along with a new CEO, was appointed. 
To plan necessary restructuring activities, the new CEO carefully evaluated all ongoing projects and 
initiatives. He first appointed an external consultant who started delving into IT – the staff, processes, 
projects and systems – and from that person the project team members could learn that the CEO did 
not necessarily believe in the “Big Bang” implementation approach chosen in the beginning. It was 
obvious that prior to making his mind up about next steps, he wanted to understand where the root 
problems resided. He also made it clear that he was prepared to perform radical changes if necessary: 
“There have been far too many projects. We cannot run them all at once”. After five months, he finally 
came back to the project team and provided his conclusions. In his view, the company had not been 
ready for so big changes in such a short time. He did not question the need for implementing a global 
ERP system per se, but he saw it as a necessary long term investment. It had to be part of long term 
development plans and to be integrated with them as part of strategy. He also saw it necessary to 
strengthen both the business and IT leaderships and the IT governance systems within the company. 
To demonstrate this, he first introduced a new CIO role within the group management and established 
an IT steering committee, chaired by himself, to start steering the troubled ERP implementation 
project. 
Slowly these actions started bringing substantial improvements. The new CEO had clearly 
demonstrated his commitment to the ERP implementation, and because of that, the project was back 
on the senior management agendas and not to be wiped out as an unnecessary nuisance. Though there 
was still a lot of resistance and concernedness, the new CEO made it clear that he wanted to have a 
more integrated group with common and shared values, culture and business systems. He also initiated 
a new management development program, which was especially designed to address and confront 
openly cultural and trust related problems resulting from the traumatic historical events; i.e. mergers, 
acquisitions and divestments. The implementation methodology was also adjusted to better match the 
changed circumstances. The quality of implementation was now primary, meeting the schedules 
secondary. Thanks to a phased, less tight rollout schedule, a much higher degree of user participation 
was achieved in all project activities. Finally in spring 2002, one of the original aims set for the ERP 
system – 80 % coverage of the total business transactions of the group – was reached. The emerging 
perception was that the system had slowly but gradually started providing tangible benefits to the 
business. It could also be seen that the implementation of a common ERP system had actually 
functioned as a means of getting a more integrated group – an important intangible, yet hardly 
originally expected benefit. Amazingly after all the struggle, the implementation was now considered 
successful – not only internally but also by many external parties, such as SAP and consulting 
companies providing implementation services. A demonstration of this was a high number of 
reference visits and benchmarking requests from other companies planning to implement or already 
implementing SAP R/3. 
5 ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS 
The core issue of ERP implementations is to gain a proper understanding of the implementation efforts 
in terms of scope, required actions and the proper timing of actions. The main challenge of ERP 
implementations is to manage the elements of change in the organisation so that the intended, desired 
changes are implemented successfully and the unintended surprises that could lead to failures are 
avoided. ERP systems impose their own logic on organisations (Davenport 1998) and this may be a 
source of cultural conflicts. Cultural changes are probably the most difficult kinds of changes to 
identify and manage because culture is something quite difficult to grasp. In a company, its culture 
often reflects the implicit beliefs, assumptions and values about what behaviours are believed to lead 
to success and as tacit, they are hard to identify and change (Schein 1999). In ERP implementations, 
the prevailing culture may be in contradiction with the desired forms of control and organisational 
structures required for implementing the optimal processes. It is likely that ERP systems enforce more 
management power and control rather than bring about organisational empowerment (Sia et al. 2002). 
Systems that alter internal power structures in an organisation are resisted by those losing power and 
accepted by those gaining power (Markus 1983). Thus information systems can be used as change 
agents and as means of advancing certain political purposes in the organisation. Such culture and 
power oriented changes had a big role in the reported case. The top management had identified the 
implementation of an integrated ERP system as a means of introducing and imposing common 
practices, even a common culture, within the group. However, there were many strong stakeholders 
and stakeholder groups who had completely different interests and priorities. Thus the implementation 
became a political act, and the battles for power complicated and delayed the process. 
Timing and mode of performing changes can have a great effect on the results. Radical changes will 
require more time and different types of interventions than simpler. Hyu (2001) has identified four 
ideal types of planned change processes: commanding, engineering, teaching and socialising. 
Commanding is appropriate for changing formal structures episodically, whereas engineering is 
appropriate for changing work processes on a more continuous basis. Teaching can be used for 
changing beliefs episodically, whereas social relationships are best changed through socialising which 
usually requires longer time. Large-scale changes require alterations of multiple organisational 
elements, thus calling for the use of several ideal intervention types. In the case, both bad timing of 
change and the inadequate use of different intervention types can be identified. The decision to roll out 
the system to the cargo securing unit in the middle of a restructuring program is an example of bad 
timing. Obviously also more time should have been put in performing work process changes. On the 
other hand, the management development program initiated by the CEO certainly helped change both 
beliefs and social relationships by teaching and gathering together people from different organisational 
entities and cultures. 
Operations and organisational forms that once were geographically limited were to be dispersed over 
several continents and time zones, and the ERP system was to facilitate this. Consequently, the users’ 
job tasks were being handled more and more within the frames of the ERP system. Thus the ERP 
system had an increasingly critical role in the business. However, such increase of criticality was not 
always welcomed by those who needed to use more information systems in their daily job tasks. Many 
employees only felt forced to use the ERP system, and saw the value of their personal qualities and 
professional competencies gradually diminishing: the main content of work seemed to become a mere 
clerical activity behind the screen. In the reported case, the importance of this matter was understood 
and learned only gradually but never really addressed. It was extremely difficult to justify the need to 
use the system because it did not always bring direct benefits to those needing to fill in data although 
the benefits were visible later and elsewhere, especially at the group level. 
The implementation of the ERP system acted as a catalyst for changes in the established roles in the 
organisation. The degree of such changes was implicated to a certain extent by the chosen 
implementation strategy: in “Big Bang” implementation approaches, combined with fundamental 
Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) activities, radical changes are more likely to occur. BPR by 
the very definition is about performing organisational changes: tasks and activities scattered around 
the organisation and performed by several different groups or functions are to be gathered into one or 
a few locations only where they are to be performed fully by the very same people only (Hammer and 
Champy 1993). As part of ERP implementation, BPR will most likely result in centralisation of some 
administrative functions, like accounting, financial reporting and financial control. This was exactly 
what was attempted at the MarineCargoSpecialist. The covert target was to rationalise and streamline 
processes whilst achieving improved results with fewer people who needed to do more. Existing roles 
changed; for example, some earlier roles (also jobs) were completely lost from small service units 
whilst new ones were introduced at the group level. This caused a lot of conflicts. Although 
organisational and role changes were covered to a certain extent as part of the rollout, the fundamental 
problem was the lack of pre-established goals for the new desired organisational forms and way of 
working. 
The concept of task-technology fit (Goodhue and Thompson 1995) can be identified as one possible 
measure for assessing the suitability of a system for a user’s job tasks. This measure describes the 
correspondence between task requirements and functionality of the technical solution. If the 
correspondence is perceived high, a user of such a technical solution should be relatively satisfied with 
the solution (and vice versa). Information systems involve different logic and ways of achieving 
certain goals. ERP systems are rich in functionality for managing functionally different sorts of tasks 
and activities almost in all kinds of businesses (Davenport 1998). Thus it is very likely that the 
functionality of a legacy or any in-house developed system differs from that available in an ERP 
system. Differences of such origin represented a major issue in the reported project: the system was 
perceived too difficult to use for typical activities; the system was too complicated, etc. Task-
technology compatibility considerations were clearly omitted in the implementation methodology 
applied. It is also an open question to what degree and detail such issues really can be covered and 
when, because it is very hard for users to see and evaluate any differences until there is some working 
– a prototype or a test – system available. It is challenging to arrange a test ERP system available for 
the purpose in the early phases of implementation as setting up such a system requires a working 
configuration based on data, structures and rules from the implementing organisation. These 
deliverables will usually be made available in the later phases of the project only. 
On an individual level, an information system can represent a fundamental change not only in terms of 
changing work practices and routines but also in terms of knowledge. Let us consider a male service 
engineer at MarineCargoSpecialist who had worked in the same business for two decades with the 
primary responsibility to service onboard ship cranes. Before the implementation of the ERP system, 
all he had needed to do was to identify the equipment onboard, identify and order required spare parts, 
perform service operations and report back to his superior the hours and material spent. He had not 
used at all any information system in his tasks but instead collected all necessary information from 
various catalogues and colleagues. Mostly he had been relying on the knowledge gained during his 
years in the job, i.e. tacit knowledge. As a result of the ERP implementation, the service engineer was 
put in charge of the order fulfilment process from the creation of a service order until the delivery of 
the ordered services. He needed to use the ERP system to identify all materials and goods to be 
delivered. Unfortunately the system did not have records of all past installations. A new standardised 
coding system was implemented to code uniquely materials from different sources and origins, but, 
unfortunately, information on old codes had been preserved only to limited extent in the system. 
Earlier, this information had been available to the service engineer in the form of printed spare part 
catalogues. The consequences can be considered catastrophic for the service engineer from his 
individual perspective. His once useful tacit knowledge was no longer useful at all in identification of 
vessels, equipment, materials and goods. In addition to learning to use the new system and managing 
new processes and practices, he now needed to learn new coding standards and re-establish the cut-off 
cognitive links between new, but meaningless codes describing equipment on the vessels and the 
actual equipment on the vessels. Consequently, he felt that his performance had decreased until he had 
again re-learned the changed job and repaired the bits and pieces of his lost knowledge. What this real-
life example points out is that it is far too simple to regard knowledge as mere structured data as 
pointed out by Boland (1987) already. Making information explicit in the form of information systems 
is not enough to turn it into knowledge but a cognitive agent (i.e. a human being) is required. It seems 
justified to suspect that many ERP implementations may be based on too optimistic views on using 
structured information as the main source of knowledge. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The case has shown that the main reasons for conflicts and problems encountered were of 
organisational and human origins. On the organisational level, there were two major change drivers: 
political problems, which resulted from changes in structures and distribution of power and 
organisational changes, which resulted from process changes and re-organisation of work within the 
group. On the individual level, changes in work roles and tasks, the required increased use of the ERP 
system in job tasks and the resulting knowledge changes were the main change drivers. As the 
implementation methodology and the approach taken to manage the implementation process were 
lacking from a realistic understanding of such human-oriented issues, the problems encountered 
appeared as unexpected consequences. The lesson of the case is that a global company considering to 
perform a radical, large-scale ERP implementation should carefully assess its culture and capabilities. 
Such assessment provides the basis for understanding the scope and magnitude of the expected 
changes, and helps planning an appropriate approach to managing the implementation efforts as a 
change process. The lack of understanding of the ERP implementation as a fundamental, strategic 
change process, the lack of leadership and commitment within the top management were the key 
reasons for all the troubles the project faced until the new CEO took over and initiated recovery. 
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